

Policy Framings for Access Control

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Stack Inspection

- access control mechanism based on the analysis of the execution stack (stack of method frames)
- classes are assigned to *protection domains*, which are granted permissions according to a security policy.
- to check if a permission P is granted to an execution:

for each frame in the call stack (starting from top)

if P is not granted to the frame

Overview of our approach

- Java Bytecode \xrightarrow{CFA} Control Flow Graph
- control flow + security checks + (dynamic) policy
- basic data flow (e.g. permissions)
- if..then..else.. and dynamic dispatching rendered as nondeterministic choice
- static analysis to compute *access control contexts*

The language $\lambda^{[\]}$ (syntax)

$e, e' ::=$

x

variable

α

access event

$\lambda_z x. e$

abstraction

$e e'$

application

$\varphi[e]$

policy framing

$\text{if } b \text{ then } e \text{ else } e'$

conditional

$\lambda. e = \lambda_z x. e$

$(z, x \notin fv(e))$

$e; e' = (\lambda. e')e$

The language $\lambda^{[]}$ (semantics)

$$\frac{\eta, e_1 \rightarrow \eta', e'_1}{\eta, e_1 e_2 \rightarrow \eta', e'_1 e_2}$$

$$\frac{\eta, e_2 \rightarrow \eta', e'_2}{\eta, v e_2 \rightarrow \eta', v e'_2}$$

$$\eta, (\lambda_z x. e)v \rightarrow \eta, e\{v/x, \lambda_z x. e/z\}$$

The language $\lambda^{[]}$ (semantics)

$$\frac{}{\eta, \alpha \rightarrow \eta\alpha, *}$$

$$\frac{\eta, e \rightarrow \eta', e' \quad \eta, \eta' \models \varphi}{\eta, \varphi[e] \rightarrow \eta', \varphi[e']}$$

$$\frac{\eta \models \varphi}{\eta, \varphi[v] \rightarrow \eta, v}$$

Programming in λ^{\square} (1)

- $Browser = \lambda u. \lambda p. \text{if } html(u)$
 then $display(u)$
 else $\text{if } trusted(u)$ then $p\ u$
 else $\varphi[p\ u; W\ *]$
- $Untrusted = \lambda z. \lambda. Browser\ z\ (\lambda y. y*)$
- $R = \lambda. \alpha_r$ (file read)
- $W = \lambda. \alpha_w$ (file write)
- $C = \lambda. \alpha_c$ (socket connection)
- $\varphi =$ “no connect after a read”
- $\varphi' =$ “no write”

Programming in λ^{\square} (2)

$\varepsilon, \text{Browser} (\text{Untrusted } W) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y*])$

Programming in λ^{\square} (2)

$$\varepsilon, \text{Browser} (\text{Untrusted } W) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y*])$$
$$\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\lambda y. \varphi' [y*] (\lambda. \text{Browser } W \lambda y. y*); W*]$$

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 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [\text{Browser } W (\lambda y. y*)]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [(\lambda y. y*) W]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [\alpha_w]; W*]$

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$\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [\text{Browser } W (\lambda y. y*)]; W*]$

$\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [(\lambda y. y*) W]; W*]$

$\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [\alpha_w]; W*]$

$\alpha_w \not\equiv \varphi' \implies$ **security exception!**

Programming in λ^{\square} (3)

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$$\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\lambda y. \varphi' [y^*] (\text{Untrusted} (\lambda. R^*; C^*)); W^*]$$

Programming in λ^{\square} (3)

$$\begin{aligned} & \varepsilon, \text{Browser} (\text{Untrusted} (\lambda. R^*; C^*)) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y^*]) \\ \rightarrow & \varepsilon, \varphi [\lambda y. \varphi' [y^*] (\text{Untrusted} (\lambda. R^*; C^*)); W^*] \\ \rightarrow & \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [\text{Browser} (\lambda. R^*; C^*) (\lambda y. y^*)]; W^*] \end{aligned}$$

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Programming in λ^{\square} (3)

$\varepsilon, Browser (Untrusted (\lambda. R^*; C^*)) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y^*])$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\lambda y. \varphi' [y^*] (Untrusted (\lambda. R^*; C^*)); W^*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [Browser (\lambda. R^*; C^*) (\lambda y. y^*)]; W^*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [R^*; C^*]; W^*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r, \varphi [\varphi' [C^*]; W^*]$

Programming in $\lambda^{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket}$ (3)

$\varepsilon, \text{Browser} (\text{Untrusted} (\lambda. R^*; C^*)) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y^*])$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\lambda y. \varphi' [y^*] (\text{Untrusted} (\lambda. R^*; C^*)); W^*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [\text{Browser} (\lambda. R^*; C^*) (\lambda y. y^*)]; W^*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [R^*; C^*]; W^*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r, \varphi [\varphi' [C^*]; W^*]$
 $\alpha_r \alpha_c \not\equiv \varphi \implies$ **security exception!**

Programming in λ^{\square} (4)

ε , *Browser (Untrusted R)* ($\lambda y. \varphi'[y*]$)

Programming in λ^{\square} (4)

$\varepsilon, \text{Browser} (\text{Untrusted } R) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y*])$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [(\lambda y. \varphi' [y*]) (\text{Untrusted } R); W*]$

Programming in λ^{\square} (4)

$\varepsilon, \text{Browser } (\text{Untrusted } R) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y*])$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [(\lambda y. \varphi' [y*]) (\text{Untrusted } R); W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [\text{Browser } R (\lambda y. y*)]; W*]$

Programming in λ^{\square} (4)

$\varepsilon, \text{Browser } (\text{Untrusted } R) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y*])$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [(\lambda y. \varphi' [y*]) (\text{Untrusted } R); W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [\text{Browser } R (\lambda y. y*)]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [R*]; W*]$

Programming in λ^{\square} (4)

$\varepsilon, \text{Browser } (\text{Untrusted } R) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y*])$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi[(\lambda y. \varphi' [y*]) (\text{Untrusted } R); W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi[\varphi' [\text{Browser } R (\lambda y. y*)]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi[\varphi' [R*]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r, \varphi[\varphi' [*]; W*]$

Programming in λ^{\square} (4)

$\varepsilon, \text{Browser } (\text{Untrusted } R) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y*])$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi[(\lambda y. \varphi' [y*]) (\text{Untrusted } R); W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi[\varphi' [\text{Browser } R (\lambda y. y*)]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi[\varphi' [R*]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r, \varphi[\varphi' [*]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r, \varphi[W*]$

Programming in λ^{\square} (4)

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 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi[(\lambda y. \varphi' [y*]) (\text{Untrusted } R); W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi[\varphi' [\text{Browser } R (\lambda y. y*)]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi[\varphi' [R*]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r, \varphi[\varphi' [*]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r, \varphi[W*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r \alpha_w, \varphi[*]$

Programming in λ^{\square} (4)

$\varepsilon, \text{Browser } (\text{Untrusted } R) (\lambda y. \varphi' [y*])$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [(\lambda y. \varphi' [y*]) (\text{Untrusted } R); W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [\text{Browser } R (\lambda y. y*)]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \varepsilon, \varphi [\varphi' [R*]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r, \varphi [\varphi' [*]; W*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r, \varphi [W*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r \alpha_w, \varphi [*]$
 $\rightarrow \alpha_r \alpha_w, *$

History Expressions

- $\text{if } b \text{ then } \alpha \text{ else } \alpha'$ $\alpha + \alpha'$

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History Expressions

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- $(\lambda x. \alpha')\alpha$ $\alpha \cdot \alpha'$
- $(\lambda y. \alpha; \varphi[y*])(\lambda x. \varphi'[\alpha'])$ $\alpha \cdot \varphi[\varphi'[\alpha']]$
- $(\lambda_z x. \alpha; z*)^*$ $\mu h. \alpha \cdot h$

History Expressions

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- $(\lambda x. \alpha')\alpha$ $\alpha \cdot \alpha'$
- $(\lambda y. \alpha; \varphi[y*])(\lambda x. \varphi'[\alpha'])$ $\alpha \cdot \varphi[\varphi'[\alpha']]$
- $(\lambda_z x. \alpha; z*)*$ $\mu h. \alpha \cdot h$
- $(\lambda_z x. \text{if } b \text{ then } \alpha \text{ else } \text{if } b' \text{ then } z z x \text{ else } \varphi[z x]) *$
 $\mu h. \alpha + h \cdot h + \varphi[h]$

History Expressions (syntax)

$H, H' ::=$

ε

empty

h

variable

α

access event

$H \cdot H'$

sequence

$H + H'$

choice

$\varphi[H]$

policy framing

$\mu h.H$

recursion

History Expressions (semantics)

$$\llbracket \varepsilon \rrbracket_\rho = \varepsilon \quad \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_\rho = \alpha \quad \llbracket h \rrbracket_\rho = \rho(h)$$

$$\llbracket H \cdot H' \rrbracket_\rho = \llbracket H \rrbracket_\rho \llbracket H' \rrbracket_\rho$$

$$\llbracket H + H' \rrbracket_\rho = \llbracket H \rrbracket_\rho \cup \llbracket H' \rrbracket_\rho$$

$$\llbracket \varphi[H] \rrbracket_\rho = \varphi[\llbracket H \rrbracket_\rho]$$

$$\llbracket \mu h.H \rrbracket_\rho = \bigcup_{n \in \omega} f^n(\emptyset), \quad f(X) = \llbracket H \rrbracket_{\rho\{X/h\}}$$

Access Control Histories

- plain histories + framing events $[\varphi$ and $]\varphi$
- notation: $[\varphi\eta]\varphi = \varphi[\eta]$
- validity: $[\varphi\alpha_r]\varphi\alpha_c$ valid, $\alpha_r[\varphi\alpha_c$ not valid
- η^b discards the framing events in η
- $\Phi(\eta)$ is the set of φ such that $[\varphi >]\varphi$ in η
- $\beta_1 \cdots \beta_n$ is **valid** iff $\beta_1 \cdots \beta_k \models \Phi(\beta_1 \cdots \beta_k)$,
for all $k \in 1..n$
- H valid iff each $\eta \in \llbracket H \rrbracket$ is valid

Extracting History Expressions

- type & effect system $\Gamma, H \vdash e : \tau$
- types: $\tau ::= unit \mid \tau \xrightarrow{H} \tau'$
- effects: history expressions H
- correctness of history expressions:

$$\varepsilon, e \rightarrow^* \eta, e' \implies \eta \in \text{prefix}(\llbracket H \rrbracket^b)$$

- type safety:

$$H \text{ valid} \implies e \text{ will not go wrong}$$

Regularizing History Expressions

- $H \downarrow$ has no redundant framings
- $H \downarrow$ valid iff H valid

Conclusions

- stack inspection + dynamic security policies
 - parametric, sound & complete static analysis
 - elimination of redundant checks and dead code
 - strong/weak method inlining & tail call elimination
 - *complete* decision procedure (for the weak version)

A Type and Effect system for λ^{\square} (1)

$$\frac{}{\Gamma, \varepsilon \vdash x : \Gamma(x)}$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma, \alpha \vdash \alpha : \text{unit}}$$

$$\Gamma, H \vdash e : \tau$$

$$\Gamma, H \vdash e : \tau$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma, \varphi[H] \vdash \varphi[e] : \tau}$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma, H + H' \vdash e : \tau}$$

$$\Gamma, H \vdash e : \tau \quad \Gamma, H \vdash e' : \tau$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma, H \vdash \text{if } b \text{ then } e \text{ else } e' : \tau}$$

A Type and Effect system for λ^{\square} (2)

$$\frac{\Gamma; x : \tau; z : \tau \xrightarrow{H} \tau', H \vdash e : \tau'}{\Gamma, \varepsilon \vdash \lambda_z x. e : \tau \xrightarrow{H} \tau'}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, H \vdash e : \tau \xrightarrow{H''} \tau' \quad \Gamma, H' \vdash e' : \tau}{\Gamma, H \cdot H' \cdot H'' \vdash ee' : \tau'}$$

A Type and Effect system for $\lambda^{\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket}$ (3)

- $e = \lambda_z x. b? \alpha + (b'? z z x + \varphi[z x])$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \Gamma, \varepsilon \vdash z : \tau \xrightarrow{H} \tau \quad \Gamma, \varepsilon \vdash x : \tau \\
 \hline
 \Gamma, H \vdash z x : \tau \\
 \hline
 \Gamma, H \cdot H \vdash z z x : \tau \quad \Gamma, \varphi[H] \vdash \varphi[z x] : \tau \\
 \hline
 \Gamma, H \cdot H + \varphi[H] \vdash z z x : \tau \quad \Gamma, H \cdot H + \varphi[H] \vdash \varphi[z x] : \tau \\
 \hline
 \Gamma, H \cdot H + \varphi[H] \vdash b' ? z z x + \varphi[z x] : \tau \\
 \hline
 \Gamma, \alpha + H \cdot H + \varphi[H] \vdash b ? \alpha + (b' ? z z x + \varphi[z x]) : \tau
 \end{array}$$

- $H = \alpha + H \cdot H + \varphi[H] \implies H = \mu h. \alpha + h \cdot h + \varphi[h]$
- $\emptyset, \varepsilon \vdash e : unit \xrightarrow{\mu h. \alpha + h \cdot h + \varphi[h]} unit$

Regularizing history expressions (1)

$$\varepsilon \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma} = \varepsilon \quad h \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma} = h \quad \alpha \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma} = \alpha$$

$$(H \cdot H') \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma} = H \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma} \cdot H' \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma}$$

$$(H + H') \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma} = H \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma} + H' \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma}$$

$$\varphi[H] \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma} = \begin{cases} H \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma} & \text{if } \varphi \in \Phi \\ \varphi[H \downarrow_{\Phi \cup \{\varphi\}, \Gamma}] & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Regularizing history expressions (2)

$$(\mu h. H) \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma} = \mu h. (H' \sigma' \downarrow_{\Phi, \Gamma \{(\mu h. H)\Gamma/h\}} \sigma)$$

where $H = H' \{h/h_i\}_i$, h_i fresh, $h \notin fv(H')$

$$\sigma(h_i) = (\mu h. H)\Gamma \downarrow_{\Phi \cup guard(h_i, H'), \Gamma}$$

$$\sigma'(h_i) = \begin{cases} h & \text{if } guard(h_i, H') \subseteq \Phi \\ h_i & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$