

Phd course on
Formal modelling and analysis of interactive systems

Part 4
Tasks and Task Failures

Tasks, Tasks Failures, Decomposition, ATC System Example

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Task Modelling and Task Analysis

Goal and Task

- **Goal:** what the user expects to achieve as the output as the interaction
- **Task:** the activity that has to be performed to achieve a goal
 - may be decomposed into sub-tasks
 - top-level task includes the goal as a sub-task
 - lower-level tasks may be associated with sub-goal a sub-task
 - \implies closure may be nested / sequentialised
 - lower-level tasks are actions

Categories of Task

- **user task**
cognitive activities performed by the user
- **application task**
outputs provided to the user by the machine
- **interaction task**
performed by the user by interacting with the system
- **abstract task**
high-level activities which involve more than one category above

Categories of Task — ATM

- **user task**
cognitive activities performed by the user
recall the pin, decide how much to withdraw
- **application task**
outputs provided to the user by the machine
deliver cash, return the card
- **interaction task**
performed by the user through interaction
insert the card, enter the pin
- **abstract task**
high-level activities
get cash, get authenticated

Task Modelling

- identify the activities
that have to be performed to achieve a goal
- decompose activities
to produce a task hierarchy
- stop the decomposition
when basic actions have been reached

Task Analysis

The **process** of analysing the way people **perform tasks**:

- **what** people do
- **what** things they work with
- **what** they must know (task knowledge)

Purpose

of Task Modelling

- define a conceptual model of a new system from a user's perspective
 - \implies build a formal model of the system
 - \implies convert it to a formal task specification

of Task Analysis

- production of training material and documentation
- requirement capture
- design / generation of user interfaces

Task Decomposition

- describe the **actions** people do
- structure them within **task-subtask hierarchy**
- describe **order of subtasks**

Used in both **Task Modelling** and **Task Analysis**

Tools for Task Decomposition

Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA)

- text and diagrams to show **hierarchy**
- plans to describe **order**

CuncurTaskTrees [Paternò 00]

- text, icons and diagrams to show **hierarchy**
- temporal relationships (using process algebra style operators) to describe **order**

HTA: Textual Notation

Hierarchy description:

- 0. make a cup of tea
 - 1. boil water
 - 2. empty pot
 - 3. put tea leaves in pot
 - 4. pour in boiling water
 - 5. wait 5 minutes
 - 6. pour tea

Plans

- Plan 0. do 1
 - at the same time, if pot is full do 2
 - then do 3 – 4 – 5
 - after 5 minutes do 6

Generating the Hierarchy


- get list of tasks
- group tasks into higher level tasks
- decompose lower level tasks further

How to know when to stop?


Stopping rules:

- **Simplicity:** Is the task simple enough?
- **Purpose:** Is the task relevant?
- **Motor Action:** lowest sensible level


HTA: Diagrammatic Notation




HTA: Decomposition




HTA: Domain Expert




HTA: Omissions




HTA: Umbalanced Hierarchy




HTA: Further Decompositions




HTA: Iteration




HTA: Final Decomposition




HTA: Fixed Sequence



HTA: Optional Tasks




HTA: Waiting for Events






HTA: Time-sharing



HTA: Mixtures



Decomposition Heuristics

- paired actions
e.g., turn on and turn off gas
- restructure/balance e.g., generate make pot
and decompose pour tea
- generalise
e.g., from make a cup of tea to make cups of
tea

Task Failure Decompositions

ATM Properties in LTL

Functional Correctness:


The ATM machine will eventually deliver cash

$$\Box(\text{ready} \rightarrow \Diamond \text{cash_out})$$

Safety:

The ATM machine will eventually return the card

$$\Box(\text{ready} \rightarrow \Diamond \text{card_out})$$




Example: ATM Machine


Goal: $\Box(\text{ready} \rightarrow \Diamond \text{coll_cash})$

Safety: $\Box(\text{ready} \rightarrow \Diamond \text{coll_card})$

Task: $\Box(\text{ready} \rightarrow ((\Diamond \text{coll_cash}) \wedge (\Diamond \text{coll_card})))$



Refined ATM Machine



ATM: Task Failure

Goal: $\Box(\text{ready} \rightarrow \Diamond \text{coll_cash})$

Safety: $\Box(\text{ready} \rightarrow \Diamond \text{coll_card})$

Task: $\Box(\text{ready} \rightarrow ((\Diamond \text{coll_cash}) \wedge (\Diamond \text{coll_card})))$

Task Failure:

$(\Box \neg \text{coll_cash}) \vee (\Box \neg \text{coll_card})$

Task Failure Decomposition

Top-level Task Failure:

$$(\Box \neg coll_cash) \vee (\Box \neg coll_card))$$

1. input wrong pin three times in a row
 \implies card confiscated and cash not collected

$$(\Box \neg coll_cash) \wedge (\Box \neg coll_card))$$

2. collect cash but not card

$$(\Diamond coll_cash) \wedge (\Box \neg coll_card))$$

3. collect card but not cash

$$(\Diamond coll_card) \wedge (\Box \neg coll_cash))$$

TF Psyc. Interpretation

Top-level Task Failure:


either card or cash is not collected


1. input wrong pin three times in a row
 - ⇒ card confiscated and cash not collected
 - ⇐ pin forgotten
2. collect cash but not card
 - ⇐ forget to collect card due to postcompletion error
3. collect card but not cash
 - ⇐ forget to collect cash

Purpose

of Task Failure Decomposition

- define specific failures (**phenotype errors**) that cause the top-level task failure
- use phenotype errors to **improve the interface**
- give phenotype errors psychological interpretations (**genotype errors**)
- perform experiment to confirm causality
genotype error \implies phenotype error
- use genotype errors to **improve the cognitive model**





Operator Choice Model (OCM)

Operator Choice Model

Scanning: The operator searches the interface **for a certain property**.

Identification: The operator identifies part of the interface that may represent the property.

Classification: The operator

- assesses whether the property is **in need of further interest**;
- if so, gives some form of priority to the property.

Decision on how to **resolve the situation**.

Action to be performed as a series of interaction with the interface.

OCM for Nuclear Plant

Scanning: The operator scans among each of the individual reactor readouts on the interface **searching for any anomalies**.

Identification: The operator identifies a particular readout.

Classification: The operator

- assesses whether the identified readout describes a **normal** or **abnormal** operation of the plant;
- if abnormal, gives a priority to the operation according to its urgency to be resolved.

Decision on how to **resolve the abnormal situation**.

Action to be performed as a series of interaction with the interface and with internal and/or external authorities.

OCM for Air Traffic Control

Scanning: The operator scans among each pair of aircraft searching for a pair that may violate separation.

Identification: The operator identifies a pair of aircraft.

Classification: The operator

- assesses whether the identified pair of aircraft will eventually violate separation (**in conflict**) or not (**not in conflict**);
- if so, gives a priority to the conflict according to its urgency to be resolved.

Decision on how to **resolve the conflict**.

Action to be performed as a series of interaction with the interface.

Air Traffic Control (ATC) System Example

Air Traffic Control (ATC)

- Aircraft fly along straight-line segments — called *flight paths* — between *waypoints* within a fixed sector of airspace.
- Aircraft *horizontal separation* must be at least **5 miles**.
- A *pair* of aircraft *violate separation* when the horizontal distance between them is **less than 5 miles** (*separation violation*).
- A *pair* of aircraft is in *conflict* when their pathways are such that the two aircraft will **eventually violate separation**.


ATC Simulator

- The ATC operator's task involves monitoring the movement of aircraft on a screen, looking for pair of aircraft that *may violate separation*.
- When such a conflict is detected, the operator uses a mouse to select one of the aircraft and change its speed using a pulldown menu.
- The *goal of the task* is to *resolve all conflicts* before they violate separation, while *not introducing any new conflict*.
- We have a *task failure* when *separation is violated*.


ATC Simulator Screenshot

Operators interact with the simulator via two main UI functions:

- selecting (by highlighting) a single aircraft;
- changing the speed of the selected aircraft.



Speed Menu



Open the menu by clicking the right button.
The menu appears at the position of the cursor.
Selected the speed by left clicking on the desired menu entry.

Operator Errors

- **slip**: inadvertently select a wrong or the current speed
 \Leftarrow selection task closure (cognitive problem)
- **mistaken identity**: change the speed of an aircraft different from the intended one
 \Leftarrow the menu appears at the position of the cursor (usability problem)
- **mis-classification, mis-prioritization, conflict generation**

The operator can **recover** from these **errors** without causing **separation violation** (**task failure**)

Model Interpretation for ATC


p = Pair of aircraft

The pair is classified

- in conflict: c_p
- not in conflict: n_p

The pair is re-classified

- not in conflict: n_p



OCM for Air Traffic Control

Scanning: The operator scans among each pair of aircraft searching for a pair that may violate separation.

Identification: The operator identifies a pair of aircraft.

Classification: The operator

- assesses whether the identified pair of aircraft will eventually violate separation (**in conflict**) or not (**not in conflict**);
- if so, gives a priority to the conflict according to its urgency to be resolved.

Decision on how to **resolve the conflict**.

Action to be performed as a series of interaction with the interface.

Environment Model

$$\begin{aligned}
 S &= s \rightarrow ((\parallel_{p:Pairs} (s_p \rightarrow C_p)) \parallel S) \\
 C_p &= (c_p \rightarrow (S \parallel D_p)) \parallel (n_p \rightarrow S) \\
 D_p &= (d_p \rightarrow (S \parallel A_p)) \parallel (n_p \rightarrow S) \\
 A_p &= (i_p \rightarrow a \rightarrow S)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 I_p &= s \rightarrow a \rightarrow ((unresolved_p \rightarrow I_p) \parallel \\
 &\quad (resolved_p \rightarrow N_p) \parallel \\
 &\quad (noeffect_p \rightarrow I_p))
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 N_p &= s \rightarrow a \rightarrow ((unnecessary_p \rightarrow N_p) \parallel \\
 &\quad (adverse_p \rightarrow I_p) \parallel \\
 &\quad (noeffect_p \rightarrow N_p))
 \end{aligned}$$

$$OCM = S \parallel (\parallel_{p:Init_I} I_p) \parallel (\parallel_{p:Init_N} N_p)$$

Task Failure Analysis

Three levels of decomposition of task failures.

A first decomposition of task failures is based on

- the **intention** of the operator to resolve a conflict (i_p);

and on the result, **benign** or **adverse**, of the operator's action:

- the fact that the initial conflict I_p is **effectively resolved** ($resolved_p$);
- the fact that in absence of initial conflict (N_p) a **new conflict is created** ($adverse_p$).

Decomposition of Task Failures

$$\text{non_resolved}_p = \neg \Diamond \text{resolved}_p$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{non_response}_p &= \text{non_resolved}_p \wedge \Box \neg i_p \\ &= \text{non_resolved}_p \wedge \text{no_intended_response}_p \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{ineffective_response}_p = \text{non_resolved}_p \wedge \Diamond i_p$$


$$\text{conflict_created}_p = \Diamond \text{adverse}_p$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathcal{D}(\text{non_response}_p) \\ &= \{f \wedge \text{non_resolved}_p \mid f \in \mathcal{D}(\text{no_intended_response}_p)\} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{fluke}_p &= (\Diamond \text{resolved}_p) \wedge \Box \neg i_p \\ &= (\Diamond \text{resolved}_p) \wedge \text{no_intended_response}_p \end{aligned}$$


Failure of Scanning

$no_intended_response_p : \quad \square \neg s_p$




Failure of Making Decision

$no_intended_response_p :$ $\square \neg s_p$
 $\diamond s_p \wedge \dots$




Persistent Mis-classification

$no_intended_response_p$: $\square \neg s_p$
 $\diamond s_p \wedge \square (s_p \vee c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc n_p)$




Persistent Mis-prioritisation

no_intended_response_p :

$$\begin{aligned} & \Box \neg s_p \\ & \Diamond s_p \wedge \Box (s_p \vee c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc n_p) \\ & \Diamond c_p \wedge \Box (c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \end{aligned}$$



Defer Action for Too Long

no_intended_response_p :

$$\begin{aligned} & \Box \neg s_p \\ & \Diamond s_p \wedge \Box (s_p \vee c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc n_p) \\ & \Diamond c_p \wedge \Box (c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \\ & \Diamond d_p \wedge \Box (d_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \end{aligned}$$


Task Failure Decomposition

$\Box \neg i_p$ is decomposed as $\Box \neg s_p$

$$\begin{aligned} & \Diamond s_p \wedge \Box (s_p \vee c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc n_p) \\ & \Diamond c_p \wedge \Box (c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \\ & \Diamond d_p \wedge \Box (d_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \end{aligned}$$


Single Mis-prioritisation

$$c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s$$

(phenotype error)

Possible **genotype errors** are

- mis-calculation
- mis-storage
- mis-retrival

of the time planned for corrective actions

\Rightarrow possible **recovery**

(through new calculation at a next scan)

Persistent Mis-prioritisation

$$\Diamond c_p \wedge \Box(c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s)$$

(phenotype error)

Possible genotype errors

- perception distorted \implies memory of result of previous mis-calculation keeps emerging

due to

- distraction
- similarity with observed non-conflicts
- high workload

Final Decomposition


$$\mathcal{D}(\textit{no_intended_response}_p) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \Box \neg s_p , \\ \Diamond s_p \wedge \Box (s_p \vee c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc n_p) , \\ \Diamond c_p \wedge \Box (c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) , \\ \Diamond d_p \wedge \Box (d_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathcal{D}(\textit{non_response}_p) \\ &= \{ f \wedge \textit{non_resolved}_p \mid f \in \mathcal{D}(\textit{no_intended_response}_p) \} \\ &= \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \Box \neg s_p \wedge \textit{non_resolved}_p, \\ \Diamond s_p \wedge \Box (s_p \vee c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc n_p) \wedge \textit{non_resolved}_p, \\ \Diamond c_p \wedge \Box (c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \wedge \textit{non_resolved}_p, \\ \Diamond d_p \wedge \Box (d_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \wedge \textit{non_resolved}_p \end{array} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Soundness


Example: **Defer action for too long**

$$(\Diamond d_p \wedge \Box(d_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s)) \rightarrow \Box \neg i_p$$



Completeness

$$\Box \neg i_p \rightarrow \bigvee_{f \in \mathcal{F}} f$$



Completeness

$$\Box \neg i_p \rightarrow \bigvee_{f \in \mathcal{F}} f$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{F} = \mathcal{D}(\Box \neg i_p) = \mathcal{D}(no_intended_response_p) = \\ \{ \Box \neg s_p , \\ \Diamond s_p \wedge \Box (s_p \vee c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc n_p) , \\ \Diamond c_p \wedge \Box (c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) , \\ \Diamond d_p \wedge \Box (d_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \} \end{aligned}$$

ATC: References


Peter Lindsay and Simon Connelly. [Modelling Erroneous Operator Behaviours for an Air-Traffic Control Task](#). AUIC 2002.

Antonio Cerone, Peter Lindsay and Simon Connelly. [Formal Analysis of Human-computer Interaction using Model-checking](#). SEFM 2005.

Antonio Cerone, Simon Connelly and Peter Lindsay. [Formal Analysis of Human Operator Behavioural Patterns in Interactive Surveillance Systems](#). *Software and System Modeling* 7(3), Springer, pages 273–286, 2008.

Task Failure Decomposition


$\Box \neg i_p$ is decomposed as $\Box \neg s_p$

$$\begin{aligned} & \Diamond s_p \wedge \Box (s_p \vee c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc n_p) \\ & \Diamond c_p \wedge \Box (c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \\ & \Diamond d_p \wedge \Box (d_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s) \end{aligned}$$


Complete Decomposition

$\Box \neg i_p$ is decomposed as $\Box \neg s_p$

- $\Diamond s_p \wedge \Box (s_p \rightarrow \bigcirc n_p)$
- $\Diamond c_p \wedge \Box (c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s)$
- $\Diamond d_p \wedge \Box (d_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s)$
- $\Diamond r_p \wedge \Box (c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc (s \vee r_p))$



Contrary Decision Process

$$\Diamond r_p \wedge \Box(c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc(s \vee r_p))$$

(phenotype error)

Possible **genotype error** is

- memory of previous decisions on similar pairs resulting in **unnecessary actions**


due to

- **fear**
- **high workload**

Error Cause

What caused such an error?


- use of the same action name *n* to denote the results of two cognitive processes
- aim at an elegant and easy to understand (to psychologists) formal model
⇒ focus on syntactical look of formulae rather than on their interpretation on the model



Exercise: Counterexample?

Find and analyse the counterexample

$s \longrightarrow s_p \longrightarrow c_p \longrightarrow s \longrightarrow s_p \longrightarrow c_p \longrightarrow n_p \longrightarrow s \longrightarrow \dots$



no_intended_response_p :

$$\Box \neg s_p$$

$$\Diamond s_p \wedge \Box (s_p \vee c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc n_p)$$

$$\Diamond c_p \wedge \Box (c_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s)$$

$$\Diamond d_p \wedge \Box (d_p \rightarrow \bigcirc s)$$

References

[Paternò 00]

Fabio Paternò.

*Model-based Design and Evaluation of
Interactive Applications.*

Springer, 2000.

Book

Introduces ConcurtaskTrees.

[Lindsay et. al. 02]

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Modelling Erroneous Operator Behaviour for an Air-traffic Control Task.

AUIC 2002, Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology, Vol. 7, Australian Computer Society, pages 43–54.

Formal Methods Paper

Incorrect decomposition for the ATC Example.

[Cerone et al. 05 and 08]

A. Cerone, P. Lindsay and S. Connelly.

Formal Analysis of Human-computer Interaction using Model-checking.

SEFM 2005, IEEE Comp. Soc., 2005, pages 352–361.

A. Cerone, S. Connelly and P. Lindsay.

Formal Analysis of Human Operator Behavioural Patterns in Interactive Surveillance Systems.

Software and Systems Modeling, Vol.7, No. 3, Springer, 2008, pages 273–286.

Formal Methods Papers

On the **correct decomposition** for the **ATC** Example, but the second is the most complete.

End